See also: Shimane confirms 1760s maps showing Takeshima as part of Japan (the Japan Times)
|Date:||April 27, 1960
Rptd Info: Amembassy SEOUL351
For Ass’t Sec’y Parsons from MacArthur.
Seoul for Ambassador McConaughy.
CHRON350 – ROK/JapanNow that we have the prospect of a new and democratic regime in Korea I strongly recommend that as soon as possible we seize opportunity to try to bring about durable solution to ROK-Japan dispute. As long as Rhee held power there seemed little chance of any solution but now we have entirely new situation which could lead to liquidation of ROK-Japan controversy.
Issues in dispute Implications of ROK-Japan dispute are not just bilateral between GOJ and ROK but deeply and directly involve US and our inescapable responsibilities in Northeast Asia. As practical matter if reasonable solution is to be found it will be produced only by our good offices and working closely with both ROK and GOJ. It is of utmost importance that we identify and be prepared to move swiftly for solution those specific ROK-GOJ problems which prevent progress toward basic settlement this festering dispute. We do not know what response Communists may make to new ROK regime and it is vital we try to put ROK-GOJ house in order as soon as possible.
While Rhee regime violated most basic tenets of democracy in authoritarian police rule imposed on Korean people, it has also in past done violence to most fundamental principles of international conduct and morality by committing acts of piracy on high seas around Rhee Line and then imprisioning and holding as political hostages Japanese fishermen and by seizing and holding non-Korean territory by force. The uncivilized practice of hostage diplomacy is one of our serious charges against Communist China and if continued by ROK it will be a great liability to a new democratic ROK regime
I therefore recommend strongly that as soon as new regime is in control in Korea (whether or not it be of interim character) we use all our influence to persuade it (1) to release and return to Japan all repeat all Japanese fishermen hostages (including those who have not completed their sentences) who have suffered so cruelly from Rhee’s uncivilized and oppressive acts and (2) to cease practice of seizing Japanese fishing vessels on high seas. This would not only rid new ROK regime of liability of practicing hostage diplomacy but also more than anything else would lay foundation in Japan for really fruitful negotiations. At same time I would be prepared to press Kishi and GOJ most strongly that in return for repatriation of all fishermen, Japanese would exercise self-restraint in their fishing operations in Korean Straits until reasonable opportunity had been given for negotiation of mutually agreed ROK-Japan fishing conservation agreement.
In addition to seizing Japanese boats on high seas and practicing hostage diplomacy, Rhee regime also seized by force and is holding illegally Takeshima Island which has always been considered as Japanese territory. This is very serious and permanent irritant in Japan-ROK relations and there can be no over-all ROK-Japan settlement until this Japanese island is returned to Japan. Therefore we should also press new ROK regime to return Takeshima to Japan. If it is unwilling to do so pending satisfactory conclusion of over-all ROK-Japan negotiations, new regime should at least signify a willingness to withdraw from Takeshima as part of mutually satisfactory settlement of
^ outstanding issues between two countries. While we should press strongly for return of Takeshima to Japan, if by any chance new regime were unwilling to do so we should, as very minimum, insist that they agree to submit matter to International Court of Justice for arbitration.
Finally, we should inform new regime very clearly that it must be prepared to adjust its relations with Japan on terms of reciprocity, in such matters as diplomatic missions, visits by businessmen and journalists, commercial trade. Japanese have suffered Rhee’s occupation-minded approach for eight years and will be unwilling to accept such indefensible treatment from his successor. In its own interests, new regime should start with conformity with normal international standards of conduct, and could most usefully begin (in terms of Japanese and other free world opinion) by permitting Japanese diplomatic mission to enter and function in ROK on same terms ROK Embassy operates here.
If we now move swiftly with new ROK regime which should generally be receptive to our views because of our helpfulness, we may
^ have initial opportunity, which may never reoccur, to influence its position on Japan-ROK
relations problem. Japanese would certainly welcome warmly and reciprocate fully, measures indicating new ROK regime willing take “new look” at Japan.
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I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your notes of July 19 and August 2, 1951 presenting certain requests for the consideration of the Government of the United States with regard to the draft treaty of peace with Japan.
With respect to request of the Korean Government that Article 2(a) of the draft be revised to provide that Japan “confirms that it renounced on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo,” the United States Government regrets that it is unable to concur in this proposed amendment. The United States Government does not feel that the Treaty should adopt the theory that Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the areas dealt with in the Declaration. As regards the island of Dokdo, otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea. It is understood that the Korean Government’s request that “Parangdo” be included among the islands named in the treaty as having been renounced by Japan has been withdrawn.
The United States Government agrees that the terms of paragraph (a) of Article 4 of the draft treaty are subject to misunderstanding and accordingly proposes, in order to meet the view of the Korean Government, to insert at the beginning of paragraph (a) the phrase, “Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article”, and then to add a new paragraph (b) reading as follows:
(b) “Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of United States Military Government in any ofthe areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3”. The present paragraph (b) of Article 4 becomes paragraph(c).
The Government of the United States regrets that it is unable to accept the Korean Government’s amendment to Article 9 of the draft treaty. In view of the many national interests involved, any attempt to include in the treaty provisions governing fishing in high seas areas would indefinitely delay the treaty’s conclusion. It is desired to point out, however, that the so-called MacArthur line will stand until the treaty comes into force, and that Korea, which obtains the benefits of Article 9, will have the opportunity of negotiating a fishing agreement with Japan prior to that date.
With respect to the Korean Government’s desire to obtain the benefits of Article 15(a) of the treaty, there would seem to be no necessity to oblige Japan to return the property of persons in Japan of Korean origin since such property was not sequestered or otherwise interfered with by the Japanese Government during the war. In view of the fact that such persons had the status of Japanese nationals it would not seem appropriate that they obtain compensation for damage to their property as a result of the war.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State: